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Reconstruction Of The Peremptory
Challenge System: A Look At Gender-
Based Peremptory Challenges
INTRODUCTION
Until recently, attorneys had absolute and unquestioned
discretion in exercising their peremptory challenges.' This
unrestrained nature of peremptory challenges was drastically altered
by the Supreme Court in 1986 when the Court ruled that
prosecutors may no longer exercise their peremptory challenges
based solely on the race of the prospective jurors.2 One of the
issues left unanswered by the Batson v. Kentucky decision is
whether gender-based peremptory challenges are impermissible as
well. Because the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the
question of gender-based peremptory challenges, lower courts have
reached conflicting conclusions.3 In an effort to resolve the conflict,
this Comment advocates that gender-based peremptory challenges,
much like their racially based counterparts, are violative of the
equal protection clause.
Part I of this Comment will provide a brief background of
peremptory challenges in the jury selection process.4 Part II will
explore the case history of discrimination in the exercise of
peremptory challenges, discussing first, racial discrimination, and
second, gender discrimination cases.5 Finally, Part Ill will discuss
1. See generally FiEDENTHAL, KANE& MILLER, CiviL PRocDUlRE § 11.10, at 523 (1985)
(explaining generally the right to a jury trial and the process of jury selection).
2. See Batsonv. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,89 (1986) (holding that peremptory challenges based
solely on race violate the equal protection clause).
3. See infra notes 91-124 and accompanying text (summarizing the conflicting lower court
decisions).
4. See infra notes 7-33 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 34-124 and accompanying text.
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the ramifications of lower court decisions and propose a resolution
to the conflict.6
I. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
The common law concept of trial by jury dates back to 1166 in
the Assize of Clarendon7 which provided that inquiries of robbery
and murder be made by "the twelve most lawful men." 8 This
concept was continued in the Magna Carta of 1215 and was carried
over to the United States by those who emigrated from England.9
This privilege of the old common law system became a protected
right in the United States under the sixth amendment of the
Constitution for criminal proceedings"0 and was reserved for many
civil proceedings in the seventh amendment."
The jury selection process begins with the "jury pool" or
"jury list" which consists of a list of names, usually drawn from
voter registration lists or telephone directories.12 From this jury
pool, a "venire" or "panel" is selected.13 Persons chosen for the
6. See infra notes 125-150 and accompanying text.
7. "Assize of Clarendon" refers to the series of ordinances initiated by King Henry II of
England in an assembly of lords at the royal hunting lodge of Clarendon. 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA 348 (1985). These ordinances attempted to improve the procedures in criminal law and
established the grand jury system consisting of twelve men. Id.
8. See generally LAFAvE & IsRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.1, at 688 (1984) (explaining
the concept of trial by jury).
9. See U
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that all criminal defendants "enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial by an impartial jury"). See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149
(1968) (holding that the right to a jury trial in criminal cases in federal courts is a fundamental right
which must be incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, thereby extending the right to jury trials
in state courts).
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (providing that "the right of trial by jury shall be preserved"
for all suits at common law where the value at controversy exceeds twenty dollars).
12. See generally WHrMIEREAD & SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 27.05, at 614-15
(1986) (explaining the process of jury selection). Some states operate on the "key man" system
where a judge appoints individuals who are responsible for selecting and maintaining jury lists. Id.
at 615. The key men are instructed to select persons of "known integrity" or "reputation for honesty
and intelligence." Id. This system usually results in a jury pool that is not as representative of the
general population as one chosen at random. Id.
13. See id. Venire is usually chosen at random except in those jurisdictions that use non-
random system such as the "key man" system. Id. See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530
(1975); Holland v. Illinois, 110 S.CL 803, 807 (1990) (both requiring that the jury pool or the venire
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venire may be exempted under a statute14 or by request.15 The
remaining persons make up the venire, or panel, which is further
developed into a jury through the "voir dire" process. 16
The purpose of voir dire examination is to ascertain whether the
prospective jurors are acquainted with the facts or the parties of the
case and whether they have a predisposition regarding the merits
of the case.17 Specifically, the prospective jurors are asked
questions regarding their background, their work, and their families,
to determine whether they harbor any biases that may impair their
fitness to serve as jurors."8 In American jurisprudence, there are
two ways of conducting a voir dire. The first method is where the
judge asks the voir dire questions of the jury panel.19 The second
method is where the lawyers themselves ask the questions.2"
The voir dire process, however, is more than an information
gathering event. The voir dire process gives attorneys the
opportunity to exclude jurors from serving in the upcoming trial.
Potential jurors are eliminated by attorneys exercising challenges
for cause and peremptory challenges.2 Challenges based on cause
be chosen nondiscriminatorily, reflecting the fair cross section of the community). See also infra
notes 69-71 and accompanying text (discussing the fair cross section requirement of the sixth
amendment).
14. See WHrrEEREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 12, § 27.10, at 615. Statutory exemption
usually excuses: (1) Aliens; (2) those who cannot speak English; (3) those under eighteen years of
age; (4) persons charged with a felony or serving a felony sentence; and, (5) those who are suffering
from mental or physical incapacity. Id.
15. See id. A prospective juror may request an exemption if he or she has previously served
as a juror, is engaged in a "critical occupation," or can show that service on a jury would produce
undue hardship for him or her. Id. The term "critical occupation" is often defined by statute and
usually includes military, government, and professional jobs. Id
16. See id. Voir dire means "speak the truth." LAFAVE & IsRAEL, supra note 8, § 21.3, at
718.
17. See generally JAMES & HAZARD, CIVIL PRocEDURE § 8.13, at 456 (19.85) (explaining the
voir dire process).
18. IM
19. Id. at 457. Attorneys are permitted to request topics of questions or even specific questions
for the judge to ask of the panel. Id.
20. Id. A judge in a jurisdiction that uses the second method monitors the voir dire process
in the same way as in examination of witnesses at trial. Id.
21. Id. The right to exercise peremptory challenges dates back to Roman Law, was preserved
by the Crown in English courts, and now exists in all jurisdictions in the United States. Raphael,
Discriminatory Jury Selection: Lower Court Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky, 25 Wiu.A.mrm
L. REV. 293, 296-97 (1989). Prior to 1305, the Crown had the power to strike an unlimited number
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require an attorney to state "narrowly specified, provable and
legally cognizable" reasons to strike a potential juror, leaving trial
judges with the ultimate discretion to grant or deny the
challenges.'
Peremptory challenges, on the other hand, may be exercised
"without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject
to the court's control."23 Peremptory challenges may be exercised
under a struck system or a sequential system.24 In a struck system,
the venire consists of the same number of people as the size of the
jury plus the number of peremptory challenges accorded to each
party.' After examining every venireperson, attorneys for both
sides exercise their cause challenges, replacing the removed jurors
by other prospective jurors who are then questioned on voir dire.2 6
The defense and prosecution then exercise their peremptory
challenges against the venirepersons.27
In contrast, the sequential system divides the selection process
into rounds where each round consists of venirepersons equalling
the size of the jury.2" The process is continued until each side
exhausts its peremptory challenges and enough venirepersons for
a jury remain upon the completion of each side's challenges for
of jurors for no stated cause, thereby creating a piosecution-biased jury. Id. at 296. Parliament
eliminated this procedural bias by depriving the Crown of its right to exercise peremptory challenges,
leaving it with only challenges for cause. Id. at 296-97. The defense, however, retained the right to
its peremptory challenges, resulting in, as Blackstone stated, "'a provision full of that tenderness and
humanity to prisoners, for which our English laws are justly famous." Id. at 297. The prosecution,
despite its loss of power to exercise peremptory challenges, continued to use a procedure which
closely resembled the peremptory challenges, the "step aside" procedure. Id. The prosecution was
permitted to ask a juror to "step aside" without giving any reason. Id. Those standing aside were
discharged if a full jury was selected from the venire. Id. The court required the prosecution's
explanation for challenging the jurors only if the entire panel was exhausted before filling the jury
box. d
22. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (explaining how challenges for cause are
exercised). There is no imit to the number of challenges for cause. See JAMES & HAZARD, supra
note 17, § 8.13, at 457 (explaining the selection of a jury in general).
23. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220 (1965).
24. See Gurney, The Case forAbolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 HARv.
C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 227, 228 (1986) (explaining the two systems of peremptory challenges).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id
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cause.29  Under either system, the number of peremptory
challenges granted to both the prosecution and defense varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In most systems, the defense is allotted
more than the prosecution.3"
The right to exercise peremptory challenges, as recognized by
the Supreme Court, remains one of the most important rights
accorded to the accused, despite the fact that the Constitution does
not require Congress or the states to grant such a right.31 The
basis for such argument lies in the purpose of peremptory
challenges, to eliminate extreme partialities on both sides and to
assure the parties that jurors will decide cases based on the
evidence before them and not on improper bases or bias.32
Challenges for cause are not sufficient by themselves to meet this
purpose because attorneys at times cannot articulate their bases for
thinking that a prospective juror is biased. Peremptory challenges
compliment challenges for cause by allowing attorneys to strike
juror who may harbor inarticulable prejudices against the
defendant, thereby attaining the goal of obtaining an impartial jury
more efficiently. Legal scholars have argued however, that in the
process of eliminating, such partialities, peremptory challenges are
used in an unconstitutionally discriminatory manner. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has held that such unconstitutional discrimination
was present in Batson.33 It is now appropriate that courts examine
whether discrimination on the basis of gender is also
unconstitutional.
29. l
30. 1l at 228-30. At common law, the defendant in a felony case was allowed three to fifteen
peremptory challenges, depending on the state. Id. In the federal system, each side has twenty
peremptory challenges in a capital case and three in a misdemeanor case, while for a felony trial, the
defendant has fifteen and the prosecution has six. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
31. See e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,219 (1965) (stating that the Constitution does
not require peremptory challenges).
32. Id
33. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88-89 (1986).
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II. PAST ADJUDICATION OF THE PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE ISSUE
Before the issue of whether gender-based peremptory challenges
violate the equal protection clause may be addressed, a historical
background is necessary to better understand how courts have
treated the problem of peremptory challenges. In tracing the history
of peremptory challenge cases, the judicial treatment of racial-based
peremptory challenges must be discussed first, because the
proposition that gender-based peremptory challenges violate the
equal protection clause is an extension of the Batson holding that
racial-based peremptory challenges violate the equal protection
clause. After the initial examination of racial-based peremptory
challenge cases, the judicial treatment of gender-based peremptory
challenges before and after Batson v. Kentucky will be discussed.
A. Judicial Treatment Of Racial-Based Peremptory Challenges
Critics of peremptory challenges argue that there is a doctrinal
inconsistency in prohibiting discrimination in one aspect of the jury
formation, the formation of a venire, and allowing discrimination
in another aspect, the selection of jurors from the venire.34 The
Supreme Court has recognized the problem and attempted to deal
with the most prominent form of discrimination in the exercise of
peremptory challenges: striking a prospective juror based on the
juror's race. 35 The Supreme Court took the first step toward
eliminating the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges
in Strauder v. West Virginia36 by holding that states cannot
discriminate in the jury selection processes.37 The Court took the
34. See Comment, The Right of Peremptory Challenge, 24 U. CHL L. Rnv. 751, 760 (1957)
(discussing the problems of peremptory challenges, such as the fairness of the number of challenges
allowed, time limitation on objecting to peremptory challenges, and the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges).
35. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that racial based peremptory
challenges violate the equal protection clause).
36. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
37. Id. at 310.
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next step in Swain v. Alabama8 by holding that states may not
use peremptory challenges to systematically exclude prospective
jurors in a repeated manner, based on race. 9 Finally, the Court
took the definitive step in Batson v. Kentucky4 by holding that
states may not use peremptory challenges in even one instance to
exclude a prospective juror based on race.41
1. Strauder v. West Virginia
The Supreme Court in Strauder v. West Virginia2 for the first
time held that the state statute depriving blacks of the opportunity
to serve on a jury is forbidden by the fourteenth amendment as a
violation of the equal protection clause.43 Strauder involved a
black man who was convicted of murder by an all white jury."
The black defendant alleged that the West Virginia statute, which
provided that only white male citizens over twenty-one years of
age could serve as a juror, violated his constitutional right to a trial
by a jury selected and impanelled without discrimination against
race or color.45 The Court stated that the prohibitory language of
the fourteenth amendment requires "immunity from inequality of
legal protection, either for life, liberty, or property," and that any
state action which denies this immunity contravenes the
Constitution.46 The Court ultimately held that every citizen is
entitled to a jury chosen in a nondiscriminatory fashion. 7 While
the Strauder court dealt with jury selection in its entirety, the first
case that specifically addressed the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges was Swain v. Alabama."
38. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
39. Id at 223-24.
40. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
41. IM. at 89.
42. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
43. Id. at 310.
44. Id at 304.
45. Id at 304-05.
46. Id. at 310.
47. Id.
48. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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2. Swain v. Alabama
In Swain, a black defendant was convicted of rape and was
sentenced to death.49 While a typical venire in his county has
usually consisted of ten to fifteen percent blacks, no black person
had actually served on a jury for over ten years.5" At Swain's
trial, among the eight black venirepersons, two were exempted and
six were peremptorily struck.5 Based on alleged invidious
discrimination in the selection of jurors, the defendant moved to
quash the indictment, to strike the jury venire, and to void the jury
based on racial discrimination. 2 The defendant's motions were
denied and his conviction was affirmed by the Alabama Supreme
Court.53 The Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari.
The issue before the Court was whether a prosecutor's exercise
of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury denied
black defendants equal protection under the law.54 The Court held
that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges must be given the
presumption of validity.55 That presumption is not overcome even
if every black person is excluded from the jury.56 The
presumption can only be overcome if it can be proven that the
prosecution has excluded Blacks over a period of many cases, so
that no black ever serves on the jury.57 Although the Swain court
admitted that some use of the peremptory challenge may violate the
equal protection clause, the evidentiary burden of proving that such
a violation had occurred was virtually impossible for a defendant
to carry. As such, the prosecution's exercise of peremptory
challenges was virtually immune from constitutional attack, despite
Swain's holding that peremptory challenges may not be used to
49. Id. at 203.
50. Id. at 205.
51. Id
52. Id at 203.
53. Id.
54. Id at 209-10.
55. Id. at 222.
56. id.
57. Id. at 223-24.
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discriminate against race or color. 8 It was not until 1986 that the
Supreme Court gave more guidance on the issue of racial-based
peremptory challenges in Batson v. Kentucky.59
3. Batson v. Kentucky
The Supreme Court in Batson reaffirmed the Swain holding that
the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenge based solely on
racial discrimination violates the equal protection clause.' The
Court also eliminated the heavy Swain evidentiary burden, which
required a showing of a pattern of systematic exclusion based on
race. The Batson court required only the establishment of a prima
facie case of discrimination upon a showing of racial exclusion
during the defendant's own case.61
In Batson, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to
strike all four blacks on the venire for the purpose of getting an all
white jury.62 The all white jury convicted Batson, a black
defendant, of second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen
goods.63 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, reaffirmed the
Swain principle by recognizing that a state's purposeful or
deliberate exclusion of blacks from a jury violates the equal
protection clause.' The Batson court based its decision on the
principle that the equal protection clause forbids the exclusion of
blacks solely based on race or on the false assumption that Blacks
as a group cannot be impartial.65 In holding that the state is free
to exercise its peremptory challenges for any reason, so long as that
reason is related to the outcome of that particular case, the majority
58. See Comment, Batson v. Kentucky: One Step Short of Halting the Discriminatory Use of
Peremptory Challenges, 21 U. ToL- L REv. 267,272 (1989) (discussing whether Batson should be
extended to forbid the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by defense counsel in criminal
trials).
59. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
60. IL at 88-89.
61. Id at 92-96.
62. Id. at 83.
63. Id.
64. Id at 84.
65. Id at 89.
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emphasized that a juror's race or color is never related to the
outcome of the case.'
Justice Marshall, in his concurrence, applauded the majority's
decision, but wrote separately to express his view that racial
discrimination in the jury selection process will continue unless the
whole practice of peremptory challenge is abolished in criminal
trials.' Chief Justice Burger dissented, stating that the Court
decided an issue that was not presented on appeal, and that a
restriction on the use of peremptory challenges contradicted the
very nature of such challenges."
Because the Batson court failed to offer language that would
indicate that exclusion from juries of other cognizable
classifications, such as gender, requires the same equal protection
analysis utilized by the Court for racial-based peremptory
challenges, a discussion of judicial treatment of gender-based
peremptory challenges both before and after Batson is essential, in
order to demonstrate the lack of uniformity in the courts and to
illustrate the need for the Supreme Court resolution of the issue.
B. Judicial Treatment Of Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges
1. Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges Before Batson v.
Kentucky
Prior to Batson, the question of the validity of gender-based
peremptory challenges was not specifically addressed, but was
relegated by the Supreme Court to an analysis under the sixth
amendment. Courts have consistently held that the sixth amendment
66. Id
67. Id at 105-08 (Marshall, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 112-21 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger noted that the petitioner was
appealing only on the issue of the sixth amendment's requirement of drawing juries from a fair cross-
section of the community. Id. at 112-13. Justices Stevens and Brennan concurred on the same
grounds. Id. at 108-11 (Stevens, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger also noted that, following the
conventional equal protection principles, the restriction on peremptory challenges for racial reasons
must necessarily be extended to include all other classifications that are subject to equal protection
scrutiny, which in effect would extinguish the whole practice of peremptory challenges. Id at 124
(Burger, CJ., dissenting).
1314
19911 A Look At Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges
requires an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the
comnunity." However, the sixth amendment analysis does not
guarantee that a cognizable group70 will not be excluded from a
jury. Cases emphasize that although the defendant is entitled under
the sixth amendment to a venire composed of a fair cross-section
of the community, he or she is not entitled to a jury composed of
a fair cross-section of the community.7  Since the sixth
amendment does not guarantee that a jury will reflect a fair cross
section of the community, states turned to their own constitutions
and an analysis of the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution.
69. See e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (holding that restricting jury
service to a special group or excluding an identifiable segment is in conflict with the constitutional
concept of jury trial); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 194 (1946) (holding that a jury in
which women were excluded is not representative of the community); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.,
328 U.S. 217,223-24 (1946) (holding that exclusion of daily wage earners from the prospective juror
list violates the requirement of an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community):
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85-86 (1942) (stating that democracy requires that the jury be
a body truly representative of the community); People v. White, 43 Cal. 2d 740,754,278 P.2d 9, 18
(1954) (holding that the American system requires an impartial jury drawn from a cross section of
the entire community). Additionally, some courts have held that gender-based exclusions violate state
constitutions. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, 515 (1979)
(holding that the exclusion of members of a discrete group solely on the basis of the group
membership violates the Massachusetts Constitution, which requires a jury drawn from a fair cross-
section of the community); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276-77, 583 P.2d 748, 761-62, 148
Cal. Rptr. 890, 903 (1978) (holding that exclusion of prospective jurors on a group bias violates the
California Constitution which requires a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community).
70. See Comment, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit
Juries, 86 YAE UJ. 1715, 1736-38 (1977) (defining a cognizable group as any identifiable group
whose members share objective characteristics such as race and sex). Although cognizable groups
may include groups defined by age, economic status, national origin, occupation, or religion, the
classifications should be treated more flexibly since they are not as clearly identifiable as groups
defined by race and sex. Id. at 1738. For the purposes of this Comment, the term "cognizable group"
refers to identifiable group defimed by race or sex. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494
(1977) (defining "identifiable group" as a group that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for
different treatment under the law).
71. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,538 (1975). The Court stated: "[]n holding that petit
juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community we impose no requirement
that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups
in the population. Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition." Id. See also
Holland v. Illinois, 110 S.Ct. 803, 807 (1990) (holding that the sixth amendment's requirement of
a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community is not intended to ensure a representative
jury, but an impartial one).
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The California Supreme Court, in People v. Wheeler,72 held
that the use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of any
identifiable group violates article I, section 16, of the California
Constitution,73 which provides that "[tirial by jury is an inviolate
right and shall be secured to all." 74 Similarly, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Soares held that the
exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors on
the basis of sex, race, color, creed or national origin violates article
12 of the Massachusetts Constitution."
a. People v. Wheeler
In the Wheeler case, two black defendants were convicted by
an all white jury of a felony murder of a white victim.7 6 Although
a number of blacks who were present in the venire did not present
any grounds for a cause challenge, all the black venirepersons were
struck by the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges.77
The defendant's motions for mistrial were denied by the trial
court.7 8
On appeal, the California Supreme Court reasoned that it is the
courts' responsibility to ensure that the guarantee of a jury drawn
from a fair cross-section of the community is not "reduced to a
hollow form of words, but remains a vital and effective safeguard
of the liberties of California citizens. ' 79 In order to ensure that
72. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
73. Id. at 272, 583 P.2d. at 758, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 16,
74. CAL. CONST. art.1, § 16.
75. Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461,387 N.E.2d 499,516 (1979). See MASS. CONST.
art.12, part I (providing that no person may be deprived of life or liberty except by the judgment of
his or her peers at a trial by jury).
76. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 262-63, 583 P.2d at 752, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 264-65,583 P.2d at 753-54, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 894-95. The defense attorney became
aware of the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude black members after the
prosecutor's second peremptory challenge of a black venireperson, and the defense attorney then
started keeping the venirepersons' race for the record. Id. All seven black venirepersons were struck
by the prosecutor through the use of peremptory challenges. Id. When the defense attorney protested,
the judge gave the prosecutor an opportunity to explain his actions, but told the prosecutor at the
same time that he need not explain his reasons for striking the prospective jurors. ld
79. Id. at 272, 583 P.2d at 758, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
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the guarantee is more than mere words, the court held that the
parties, in exercising their peremptory challenges, must believe that
the juror being struck is consciously or unconsciously biased
against their client.8" However, the court noted that a presumption
of bias based solely on the grounds of the juror's membership in
an identifiable group, such as race, religion, ethnic or similar
grounds,. "frustrates the primary purpose of the representative
cross-section requirement." 1
Recognizing that the exercise of peremptory challenges based
solely on group affiliation violates the state constitution, the
Wheeler court fashioned a procedural remedy, concluding that the
presumption of constitutionality of the party's use of peremptory
challenge could be rebutted by a prima facie showing of
discrimination.12 Furthermore, the Court held that the defendant
may establish a prima facie case by showing that the persons
excluded are members of a cognizable group against whom
discrimination is prohibited, and by demonstrating that under the
circumstances of the case there is a "strong likelihood" of
exclusion based on group affiliation, rather than any specific
bias.83 Finally, once a prima facie case of discrimination is
established, the court explained that the burden shifts to the other
party to rebut.84 To rebut the prima facie case, the allegedly
offending party must demonstrate that the juror's exclusion was
based on a specific bias. However, this demonstration "need not
rise to the level of a challenge for cause."85
80. Id. at 274-75, 583 P.2d at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
81. id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
82. Id. at 278-80, 583 P.2d at 762-64, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 904-5. The Court explained that the
reason for adopting the presumption of constitutionality was in deference to the legislative intent
underlying peremptory challenges to encourage their use in proper cases, and out of respect for
counsel as officers of the court. Id.
83. l The court defined "group bias" as discrimination against a juror because he or she
is a member of an "identifiable group." Id. at 276, 583 P.2d. 761, 148 Cal.Rptr. at 902. The court
defined "specific bias" as a bias relating to the particular case on trial, the parties, or the witnesses.
Id. The Wlheeler court made a distinction between group bias and specific bias, prohibiting group bias
while allowing specific bias. Id. at 276-77, 583 P.2d. at 761-62, 148 Cal.Rptr. at 903.
84. Id. at 281,583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906. The court specified that the showing
of non-discriminatory basis need not rise to the level of challenge for cause. Id. at 282, 583 P.2d at
765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
85. L at 281-82, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr at 906.
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b. Commonwealth v. Soares
In the Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Soares,86 three
black defendants were charged and convicted of assault, battery,
and murder of white victims.87 Although the court could not find
a reason to sustain challenges for cause, the prosecutor used his
peremptory challenges to strike twelve out of thirteen black
venirepersons, resulting in a jury composed of eleven white jurors
and one black juror.88
Using reasoning similar to that employed in Wheeler, the
Soares court held that the exercise of peremptory challenges to
exclude prospective jurors on the basis of sex, race, color, creed,
or national origin violated article 12 of the Massachusetts
Constitution. 9 The Soares court adopted a procedural remedy
similar to the remedy adopted by the Wheeler court, establishing a
rebuttable presumption of the constitutionality of the exercise of
peremptory challenges.'
Because of the decisions in Wheeler and Soares, citizens of
California and Massachusetts are guaranteed the selection of a jury
untainted by racial or gender discrimination. The California and
Massachusetts holdings suggest that states need not look to Batson
for language which would permit an extension of the Court's
reasoning to prohibit gender-based peremptory challenges.
However, other state courts were faced with the problem of
whether to allow gender-based peremptory challenges in the
absence of support from a state constitution. Thus, with the
Supreme Court's holding in Batson v. Kentucky, the time was ripe
for the states to attempt to apply the equal protection analysis used
86. 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1979).
87. Id., 387 N.E.2d at 503-06.
88. Id. at 508.
89. Id. at 516. See MASS. CONST. art. 12 (providing that no person may be arrested or
imprisoned except by a judgment of his or her peers, and that the legislature may not make any law
that will subject a person to a capital or infamous punishment without a trial by a jury). See also id.
arLt. 15 (providing that the parties have a right to a trial by jury and that this method of procedure is
sacred).
90. Wheeler, 387 N.E.2d at 517.
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by the Batson court to eliminate racial-based peremptory challenges
to the problem of gender-based peremptory challenges.
2. Judicial Treatment of Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges
After Batson v. Kentucky
State and federal courts have not been in agreement on the
issue of whether the Batson court intended to apply the equal
protection analysis to gender-based peremptory challenges. At the
federal level, the Ninth Circuit held that gender-based peremptory
challenges violate the equal protection clause,9 while the Fourth
Circuit held that these same challenges are constitutional.' At the
state level in State v. Oliviera, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
agreed with the Fourth Circuit's United State v. Hamilton, in
holding that the Batson Court did not intend to extend the
prohibition of racial-based peremptory challenges to gender-based
peremptory challenges.93 The Supreme Court of New York,
Appellate Division agreed, however, with the Ninth Circuit, holding
that gender-based peremptory challenges should be prohibited.94
a. United States v. De Gross
In the Ninth Circuit case, United States v. De Gross,95 a jury
consisting of three men and nine women convicted a female
defendant of two counts of aiding and abetting the transportation
of an alien within the United States." The defense attorney used
seven of his peremptory challenges to strike male venirepersons.9
91. See United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1423 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that gender
based peremptory challenges violate the equal protection clause).
92. See United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1042 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that Batson
did not prohibit gender based peremptory challenges).
93. See State v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867, 870 (R.I. 1987) (holding that Batson encompassed
only racial based peremptory challenges).
94. See New York v. Irizarry, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279, 280 (1990) (holding that gender based
peremptory challenges violate the equal protection clause).
95. 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990).
96. Id. at 1419-20.
97. Id. at 1419.
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The district court denied the defense's eighth peremptory challenge
against another male when the prosecution objected on the grounds
of intentional discrimination.9" The court ruled that the
government made a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination
when it objected to the defense's use of peremptory challenges to
strike seven males from the jury pool." After holding that the
government had standing to object to the defense's peremptory
challenges, the court announced that such gender classification
must be substantially related to the achievement of an important
governmental objective."° The court found the governmental
objective to be the impaneling of a fair and impartial jury, but held
that gender-based peremptory challenges were based on the false
assumption that members of certain groups are unqualified to serve
as jurors, and that members of certain groups are unable to
consider the case against a member or a nonmember of their group
impartially."0' The court concluded that gender-based peremptory
challenges are not substantially related to achieving an impartial
jury, and therefore the exercise of peremptory challenges in this
case violates the equal protection clause. " In reaching its
conclusion, the De Gross court analogized gender-based
98. Id.
99. Rd Before disallowing her peremptory challenge against the seventh male vcnireperson,
the court gave De Gross the opportunity to explain her reasons for strildng the male venire persons,
as required by Batson. Id. However, she offered none. ld. De Gross also had an equal protection
objection to the government's challenge against the only Hispanic venire person, but the court ruled
that the government's explanation of wanting more males on the jury satisfied the burden. Id. at
1419-20.
100. Xd at 1421-22. The court found support for its holding that the government has standing
from the language of Batson, which stated that "discrimination in the selection of jurors harms not
only the accused, but also the excluded juror and the entire community." Id. at 1420 (citing Batson,
476 U.S. at 87. The court held that the government, because of its interest in protecting the rights of
its citizens, had standing to assert the equal protection rights of the venireperson sought to be
excluded. Id. at 1421. Later in the opinion, the court also held that the prohibition of discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges applies to the defense as well as the prosecution, because the harm
caused is the same, and there is state action due to the fact the defense uses a right created by the
government. Id. at 1423-24.
101. IM at 1422.
102. Id at 1422-23. The court also noted that the government has an interest in promoting
public confidence in the judicial system and in discouraging community prejudice, and that gender
discrimination during jury selection is not substantially related to achieving those interests. Id at
1422. Throughout the opinion, the court emphasized that "gender bears no relationship to an
individual's ability to participate on a jury." Id at 1422-23.
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peremptory challenges to those based on race by holding that
gender, like race, is not an indication of one's ability to serve as a
juror. 103
b. United States v. Hamilton
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit, in United States v.
Hamilton,1 4 held that the Batson Court did not offer any
authority to extend its decision to prohibit gender-based peremptory
challenges."' Hamilton involved a number of black defendants
who were convicted of various drug-related offenses."°6 When
requested to give its reasons for striking seven of the eight black
venire women, the government offered the explanation that it
wanted more men on the jury.117 The court accepted the
explanation as a racially neutral explanation and rejected the
contention that Batson should be extended to apply to gender-based
peremptory challenges.10 8 The court noted that although Batson
relaxed the evidentiary burden of Swain, Batson had "offered no
intimation that it was extending the equal protection safeguards
involving peremptory strikes to gender."'" The court stated that
although the Batson Court could have clearly abolished the
peremptory challenge or prohibit the use of challenge based on
race, gender, age or other group classification, the Court had not
done so because of the important role that peremptory challenges
play in the jury system."' The court concluded that the Court in
Batson intended to restrict the exercise of peremptory challenges
on racial grounds alone."'
103. Id. at 1422.
104. 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988).
105. Id at 1042.
106. Id at 1038.
107. Id at 1041. The convicting jury consisted of six white females, three black females, and
three white males. Id
108. Id at 1042.
109. Ia
110. Id See supra note 32 (stating the important role of peremptory challenges as obtaining
an impartial jury).
111. Id at 1043.
1321
Pacific Law Journal/Vol. 22
c. State v. Oliviera
The state of Rhode Island, in addressing the problem of gender-
based peremptory challenges, agreed with the Fourth Circuit in
holding that Batson does not extend to gender-based
discrimination. 112 In Oliviera, Thomas Oliviera was convicted of
second degree child molestation and assault with intent to commit
a sexual act.' On appeal, he contended that the prosecution
discriminated against male members of the jury panel by exercising
six of its seven peremptory challenges to remove males from the
jury, thereby violating the equal protection clause. 14
The Oliviera court concluded that Batson applied only to
discrimination based on race, not discrimination based on
gender."' The court noted that one of the purposes of the Batson
decision was to cure the long history of discrimination against
blacks in the jury selection process and that unlike blacks, males
have not suffered a long history of discrimination in jury selection
process."' Therefore, the Oliviera court held that the
prosecution's exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude males
from the jury did not violate the equal protection clause." 7
dL New York v. Irizarry
In contrast, New York, in addressing the question of extending
Batson to prohibit gender-based peremptory challenges, agreed with
the Ninth Circuit in holding that exclusion of venirepersons based
on their gender violated the equal protection clause." 8 The
prosecutor in New York v. Irizarry peremptorily struck all five
females from the venire. 19 Consequently, a male defendant was
112. See State v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867, 870 (Il. 1987).
113. Id at 867.
114. Id
115. I at 870.
116. Id
117. Id.
118. New York v. Irfzarry, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279 (1990).
119. Idat 279.
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convicted of burglary by a jury consisting of eleven men and one
woman."0 Relying on Batson, the defendant moved for mistrial
because the prosecutor excluded women from the jury.121
The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, affirmed
the trial court's decision that "women were a cognizable group for
Batson purposes," and held that the Batson principle of selecting
jury members pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria applies "to the
improper use of peremptory challenges to exclude women from a
petit jury."" The court also stated that the Batson principle
should be applied to gender-based peremptory challenges because
gender-based distinctions are subject to "strict scrutiny"123 The
Irizarry court may have used the wrong standard of review for
gender-based classification by utilizing the strict scrutiny test
instead of the mid-level scrutiny that has traditionally been used by
the Supreme Court of the United States. 124 Thus, the few courts
who have addressed the issue of gender-based peremptory
challenges are in conflict. Given the conflicting positions taken by
the lower courts regarding gender-based peremptory challenges, and
given the importance of the issue, the Supreme Court of the United
States is likely to resolve the conflict in the near future.
M. CONSITUTIONAL1TY OF GENDER-BASED
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
In its efforts to resolve the issue of gender-based peremptory
challenges, the Supreme Court will have to address several related
issues. The Court must first determine whether the peremptory
120. Id.
121. Id. at 279-80.
122. let at 280. The court also held that although the defendant was a male, he had standing
to challenge the exclusion of females because discrimination in the jury selection process harms not
only the defendant, but also the excluded juror and the society as a whole. Id.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718 (1982); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981); Craig v. Boren, 249 U.S. 190
(1976) (holding that the standard of review for gender classification is not a strict scrutiny but a mid-
level scrutiny, which is satisfied only if the classification substantially furthers an important
governmental objective).
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challenge system should be preserved. The Court must address this
critical issue first, because placing another restriction on the
exercise of peremptory challenges would, arguably, chip away at
the very nature of peremptory challenges. If the Court decides to
preserve peremptory challenges despite the changes any restrictions
would bring to the exercise of peremptory challenges, it must then
address the issue of gender-based peremptory challenges and
juxtapose that with the courts' treatment of racial-based peremptory
challenges and with the nature of the peremptory challenges itself.
A. Peremptory Challenges Should Not Be Abolished
The Supreme Court Justices have recognized that placing
restrictions of any kind on peremptory challenges must be
reconciled with the very nature of the challenges themselves.
125
For instance, Justice White, writing the majority opinion in Swain
v. Alabama, noted that subjecting peremptory challenges to the
demands of the equal protection clause would radically change the
nature and operation of the challenge so that the challenge is no
longer arbitrary.126 In the eyes of Justice White, such a change in
the character of the peremptory challenges would be unwarranted
at any cost. Chief Justice Burger states a similar view in his dissent
in Batson v. Kentucky, in which he stressed that requiring
rationality in government action has no application in "an arbitrary
and capricious right."127 Although Justices White and Burger
preferred leaving the peremptory challenge system in its pure form
125. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (arguing that
peremptory challenges must be abolished to completely eliminate discrimination in the jury selection).
Some commentators have raised similar arguments. See e.g., Gurney, The Case for Abolishing
Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trial, 21 HARv. C.R. - C.L. L. REv. 227 (1986) (advocating the
abolition of peremptory challenges in criminal proceedings); Comment, Batson v. Kentucky: A Half
Step in the Right Direction (Racial Discrimination and Peremptory Challenges Under the Heavier
Confines of Equal Protection), 72 CoRuus.L L. REv. 1026 (1987) (advocating the elimination of
peremptory challenges as a remedy for the misuse of peremptory challenges).
126. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1965).
127. Batson, 476 U.S. at 123 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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with no restrictions,"' others have recommended for a complete
abolition of the system.
In the Batson decision, Justice Marshall indicated his belief that
the only way to end discrimination is to eliminate peremptory
challenges entirely.129 Justice Marshall explained that the right of
peremptory challenges is "not of constitutional magnitude" and
can be eliminated without impairing the constitutional guarantee of
an impartial jury and fair trial.13 Justice Goldberg, in his dissent
in Swain v. Alabama, emphasized that the Constitution compels the
protection of a defendant's right to have a jury chosen in
conformity with the requirements of the fourteenth amendment,
rather than the right to exercise peremptory challenges.13'
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that peremptory
challenges are not required by the Constitution,132 historically, the
Court has repeatedly upheld the system as a necessary part of trial
by jury.'33 Given the long history and the deference accorded to
peremptory challenges by the Court and given the Court's current
conservative composition, it is highly unlikely that the Court would
take on the task of abolishing a practice that is as old as the Court
itself.
Another argument for preserving peremptory challenges is that
without peremptory challenges, the courts are left only with
challenges for cause. Allowing challenges for cause to take over
the functions served by peremptory challenges would be
128. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 112 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (arguing that peremptory challenges
should be allowed without restrictions placed by the equal protection clause); Swain, 380 U.S. at 227
(holding that there must be a showing of pattern of systematic discrimination before the exercise of
peremptory challenges can violate the Equal Protection Clause).
129. Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall, L, concurring).
130. Id at 108 (Marshall, J., concurring).
131. Swain, 380 U.S. at 244 (Goldberg, L, dissenting).
132. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986); Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583,
586 (1919) (stating that peremptory challenges are not of constitutional origin).
133. See Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894) (upholding peremptory challenges
as one of the most important rights secured to the accused); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370,
376 (1892) (stating that peremptory challenges are a necessary part of trial by jury).
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difficult.134 Although both challenges have the ultimate goal of
obtaining a fair and impartial jury, attorneys have always relied on
peremptory challenges when they are not able to articulate reasons
for feeling that certain jurors have bias or prejudice against their
clients. Challenges for cause, without its peremptory counterpart,
will not satisfactorily serve the function of obtaining a fair and
impartial jury. The reason is two-fold. First, jurors can sometimes
deceive the court regarding their prejudices, consciously or
subconsciously, during voir dire, thereby escaping elimination
under challenges for cause alone. Without peremptory challenges,
courts must rely upon the juror's statement of impartiality.
Peremptory challenges operate as a safeguard in cases where the
juror's statement of impartiality is not credible but there exists no
effectively way of impugning the juror's credibility. Second, the
requirement of court approval for challenges for cause may further
frustrate the attorney's efforts to obtain an impartial jury, because
without peremptory challenges attorneys are prohibited from
eliminating a juror when the court does not agree that the juror
should be excused for cause.
Considering the Supreme Court's acceptance of peremptory
challenges as a necessary tool of a jury trial and the consequence
of abolishing peremptory challenges, it is likely that the Court will
choose to preserve the peremptory challenge system, even if it has
to alter the nature of the system by placing restrictions required by
the equal protection clause. The Batson court's willingness to limit
peremptory challenges rather than abolishing them altogether is a
further support for the view that the Supreme Court will not
abolish the peremptory challenge system.
134. See Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On
Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARV. L REV. 808, 839 (1989) (contending that
allowing challenges for cause to take over the functions served by peremptory challenges would be
unwise because the challenge for cause does not permit court to assess jurors' bias realistically).
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B. Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges Should Be Prohibited as
a Violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Once the Court determines that the peremptory challenges
should be preserved, the next consideration would be whether
gender-based peremptory challenges should be prohibited. In
contemplating the issue of gender-based peremptory challenges, the
Supreme Court should recognize that although racial and gender
classifications have traditionally been analyzed differently,135 in
the context of peremptory challenges gender classification shares
many similar characteristics with racial classification, to warrant
similar treatment under the equal protection clause.
Racial and gender classifications are analogous in three
respects. First, both groups have historically suffered disparate
treatment because of their membership to an identifiable group.
Second, race and gender are immutable characteristics, which
cannot be changed. Finally, both members of minority races and
members of the female gender, have historically been politically
powerless. Because of these reasons, race and gender classifications
have traditionally been treated with special care by the courts.136
Considering the similarities between classifications based on
race and those based on gender, it seems as though gender
classifications should be given the same strict scrutiny that is
135. Gender groups have been recognized as quasi-suspect classes whose standard of review
is the mid-level scrutiny, whereas racial groups have been recognized as suspect classes whose
standard of review is a higher one of strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)
(holding that gender classifications are quasi-suspect classes deserving of mid-level scrutiny, which
can be satisfied only if the classification substantially furthers an important state interest). See also
Galloway, Basic Equal Protection Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 121, 142 (1989) (explaining
that the Supreme Court has held that classifications based on gender are semi-suspect and violate the
equal protection clause unless they are substantially related to an important government interest). See
id. at 132 (explaining that the core purpose of the equal protection clause was to protect the recently
liberated blacks from government discrimination). The Court has extended the protection to other
minorities, holding that classifications based on race violates the Equal Protection Clause unless they
are necessary to further a compelling government interest. See id.
136. Cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that
mentally retarded persons are not a quasi-suspect class because they do not satisfy the requirements
of a quasi-suspect class, such as historical discrimination, immutable trait, and political
powerlessness).
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accorded to racial classifications. However, the Supreme Court has
refused to administer heightened review to gender classifications.
The Court has often reasoned that disparate treatment based on race
is rarely justifiable. Disparate treatment based on gender, on the
other hand, is justifiable in some cases because of the physical
differences that exist between men and women. For example, the
Court has previously held that imposing criminal sanctions for
statutory rape only on men is constitutional because women are
deterred from committing rape by the possibility of pregnancy."3 7
However, the physical differences between the genders do not have
any bearing on a person's ability to serve as a juror.
Batson held that states may not exclude jurors based on race on
the false assumption that persons of that race as a group are not
qualified to serve as jurors.138 The Court reasoned that the
competence to serve as a juror depends on an assessment of
individual qualifications, and ability to consider evidence
impartially at trial.139 Therefore, a person's race is simply
unrelated to his or her fitness as a juror. 4 ' Similarly, there is no
basis to assume that persons of one gender as a group are not
qualified to serve as jurors. Additionally, the Court stated that
public confidence in the justice system is undermined when the
jury selection procedure purposefully excludes blacks because of
their race. 4' Public confidence is undermined because the state's
exclusion based on race is readily identifiable, thus indicating to
the public that the state is engaged in an impermissible practice of
discrimination. Such a display of discrimination works to invalidate
the credibility of the judicial system. The public confidence is
equally undermined when the procedure purposefully excludes
persons solely based on their gender, because exclusion based on
gender is as easily identifiable as that based on race.
137. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (holding that imposition of
criminal liability only on males for statutory rape is constitutional because females are deterred by
fear of pregnancy). See also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (holding that requiring only
males to register for draft is constitutional because only males are allowed to engage in a combat).
138. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986).
139. Id at 87.
140. Id.
141. Id.
1328
1991/A Look At Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges
If the Court plans to keep peremptory challenges but satisfy the
requirements of the equal protection clause, the only limitation to
peremptory challenges, other than the prohibition against racial
based exclusion, should be the prohibition against gender-based
exclusion. Prohibition of gender-based peremptory challenges is not
only a logical extension of the Batson prohibition, but is also the
logical place to end the restructuring of the peremptory challenge.
Some commentators have argued that a distinction cannot be made
between gender and other classifications. As Justice Burger noted
in his dissent in Batson, the conventional equal protection
principles would have to include prohibition of peremptory
challenges based not only on race and sex, but also on "religious
or political affiliation, mental capacity, number of children, living
arrangements, and employment in a particular industry."142
However, while courts have held that the equal protection clause
specifically requires that no person in a similar situation be treated
disparately, the Court only applies heightened scrutiny to members
of suspect classes.143 The people belonging to the classifications
mentioned by the Chief Justice are not accorded heightened
scrutiny. The Court has never afforded the kind of protection it has
given to classifications based on race and gender to the
classifications mentioned by Justice Burger. The reason that higher
protection has been withheld from the people belonging to the
classifications that Justice Burger mentioned is because, according
to the Supreme Court, those people have not experienced the kind
of discrimination historically suffered by people belonging to a
certain race or gender.'" Such classes do not share the unequal
treatment or political powerlessness suffered by minorities and
females. Moreover, most of classes mentioned by Justice Burger do
not share immutable traits. The classification other than gender
142. Id. at 124 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
143. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1981).
144. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that
mentally retarded people are not a quasi-suspect class because they are not politically powerless, and
their disabilities cannot be distinguished from other immutable non-suspect class disabilities such as
age or physical handicap); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976)
(declining to extend heightened review to differential treatment based on age because the aged have
not experienced a history of purposeful unequal treatment).
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which the Court has recognized as deserving of a higher review
accorded to quasi-suspect class, is illegitimate children.
145
However, classifications based on illegitimacy may be readily
distinguished from those based on gender because, typically,
illegitimacy has presented a problem only in cases involving a
beneficiary's eligibility to inherit. 4 6 Moreover, Justice Brennan
has specifically stated that discrimination against illegitimates has
never been as severe or pervasive as the historic legal and political
discrimination against women and blacks. 47 Today's society no
longer place much stigma on illegitimacy. Therefore, discrimination
based on illegitimacy is less of a problem. 148 Additionally, the
community cannot readily ascertain the existence of discrimination
against illegitimacy since that trait is not immediately visible, and
thus, the public confidence in the judicial system would not be
undermined by allowing peremptory challenges based on such a
classification. 149 Therefore, although illegitimacy may share the
quasi-suspect classification with gender classification, it is not as
crucial to prohibit illegitimacy based peremptory challenges as
compared to gender-based peremptory challenges.
Because of the similarities shared by racial-based and gender-
based peremptory challenges, the Supreme Court should prohibit
gender-based peremptory challenges as violative of the equal
145. See United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27 (1980); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 268
(1978) (holding that classification based on illegitimacy is unconstitutional unless the classification
is substantially related to a particular interest of the state).
146. See, e.g., Jimenez v.Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (invalidating a federal classification
which did not permit some illegitimate children to obtain benefits under parent's disability insumce);
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (invalidating a statute that did not permit
dependent, illegitimate children of a father to recover workers' compensation benefits for death of
the father).
147. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-86 (1973).
148. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2346 (1989) (stating that California does
not recognize legitimacy and illegitimacy as distinct classes).
149. Some may argue that illegitimacy is as readily ascertainable as race and gender since
although not a visible trait, as illegitimacy can be easily recognized if every person who answers
"yes" to the question "'are you an illegitimate child?" is excluded from the venire. However, such
a problem will not present itself often. The only occasion which will prompt questions regarding
illegitimacy is when the case involves the issue of illegitimacy. In other cases, the question has no
relevancy and therefore will most likely not be asked. In contrast, the state need not ask whether the
prospective juror is male or female before excluding him or her, because gender is clearly visible.
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protection clause. Since classifications based on other factors do
not present the same problems as does classifications based on
gender, the gender-based peremptory challenge is the logical place
to end the restrictions on peremptory challenges.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court took "a historic step" when it sought to
eliminate racial discrimination in the selection of juries.15 °
However, that "historic step" is not complete if the Court allows
sexual discrimination in a process that is designed to guarantee a
fair trial. To end the conflict among the lower courts, and more
importantly, to end the continuing discrimination in courtrooms,
Batson v. Kentucky should be extended to prohibit gender-based
peremptory challenge, because both types of challenges violate the
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.
S. Alexandria Jo
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